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PRETRIAL DIVERSION: THE PREMATURE
QUEST FOR RECOGNITION
Raymond T. Nimmer*
Patricia Ann Krauthaus**
Pretrial diversion has been one of the most enthusiastically promoted
criminal justice reforms of recent years. There are more than forty well-
funded diversion programs in operation dealing with more than 10,000
criminal defendants each year.1 Three federal commissions have referred
favorably to diversion 2 and grant programs of both the Justice Department
and the Department of Labor which have actively fostered the creation and
*Assistant Professor, University of Houston School of Law. B.A., 1966, Valparaiso
University; J.D., 1968, Valparaiso University School of Law.
**Research Associate, American Bar Foundation. B.A., 1972.
The authors were, respectively, project director and project assistant director of
the recently completed American Bar Foundation study of pretrial diversion. Mr.
Nimmer was a consultant to the Courts Task Force of the National Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals relating to standards for pretrial diversion and
is currently a member of the Task Force on Diversion and Plea Bargaining of the
National Study Commission on Defense Services. The article is based on observations
and other data derived from that study and on a review of recent published materials
relating to pretrial diversion. It reflects, however, the opinions of the authors and
not those of the American Bar Foundation or of the agencies that provided financial
support for the underlying study. The study report was published by the American
Bar Foundation as R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
PROSECUTION (1974).
1 What follows is an incomplete list of states and cities in which diversion programs
exist. In many of the cities, more than one program is in operation.
Statute or court rule: Federal court system, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
Administrative: Syracuse, N.Y.; N.Y. City (all boroughs); Rochester, N.Y.;
Nassau County, N.Y.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Cleveland, Ohio; Minneapolis, Minn.; Des
Moines, Iowa; Chicago, Ill.; Atlanta, Ga.; San Jose, Cal.; Santa Rosa, Cal.; Hayward,
Cal.; San Bernadino, Cal.; Baltimore, Md.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Washington, D.C.;
New Haven, Conn.; San Antonio, Tex.; Boston, Mass.; Miami, Fla.; Genessee
County, Mich.; Jersey City, N.J. (Hudson County); Newark, N.J.
2 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133-34 (1967); PRESI-
DENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRISON REHABILITATION, THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER-WHAT
SHOULD BE DONE? 22 (1970); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, Standard 3.1, at
95 (1973). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 90 (Approved Draft 1971); COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DIVERSION OF
CASES (1974). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL PRETRIAL IN-
TERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, DIVERSION FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
59-66 (1973).
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expansion of diversion programs.3 Several states are considering legislation
to establish diversion as a formal element of the criminal justice system4
and federal legislation is currently pending. 5
Many advocates of diversion claim that the concept has been empirically
established as an effective reform. Their conclusions are typically based on
program self-evaluative studies6 which, on their surface, appear to suggest
the successful achievement of reform goals. In fact, however, these studies
offer little reliable support for the suggested conclusion. Amid the general
enthusiasm, several observers have begun to question both the concept of
diversion and its record of goal achievement.7 Although the questioning is
often no more than tentative, it nevertheless suggests that a variety of
issues should be closely examined before diversion can be safely imple-
mented on a broad basis. Current data does not support the belief that
diversion achieves its stated goals, and further, suggests the possibility that
diversion may in fact be detrimental to defendants' interests.
I. DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND OF DIVERSION
"Diversion" refers to procedures whereby defendants are given the
option to participate in some specified course of conduct in lieu of prose-
cution.8 Adequate compliance with the specified obligations imposed by the
3See, e.g., ABT ASSOCIATES, PRETRIAL INTERVENTION: A PROGRAM EVALUATION
1-2 (1974).4 See, e.g., Conn. Pub. Act No. 73-641 (1973); Mass. H. Bill No. 2199, An Act
Establishing a District Court Procedure for the Pretrial Diversion of Selected Offend-
ers to Programs of Community Supervision and Service (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 218, § 43A (Supp. 1972); Note, Diversion of Drug Offenders in California,
26 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1974).
5 See S. REP. No. 417, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 798 Before the
Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on H.R. 9007 Before the Subcomn. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
(;See, e.g., B. COHEN, PROJECT OPERATION MIDWAY (1972); E. DEGRAZIA, REPORT
ON PRETRIAL DIVERSION OF ACCUSED OFFENDERS TO COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT PROGRAMS (1972); GEORGIA DEPT. OF LABOR, ATLANTA PRETRIAL IN-
TERVENTION PROJECT FINAL REPORT (1973); NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, FINAL REPORT: PROJECT CROSSROADS (1971); VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1972).
7 See J. MULLEN, THE DILEMMA OF DIVERSION: RESOURCE MATERIALS ON ADULT
PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS (1975); R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION 103-08 (1974); Goldberg, Pretrial Diversion:
Bilk or Bargain? 31 NLADA BRIEFCASE 490 (1974); Zimring, Measuring the Imn pact
of Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Justice System, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 224
(1974); Comment, Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control, 10
HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 180 (1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion from the
Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974); Statement of Daniel Freed on H.R.
9007, in Hearings on H.R. 9007, supra note 5.
8 But see Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversion from the Criminal Justice
System: Practice in Search of a Theory, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA 151 (L. Ohlin ed.
1973). This article focuses on pretrial diversion within the adult criminal justice
system. See D. CRESSEY & R. MCDERMOTr, DIVERSION FROM THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1973); E. LEMERT, INSTEAD OF COURT: DIVERSION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
(1971); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NEW
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diversion program most often leads to dismissal of chargesY The specified
obligations may range from a general requirement of "good behavior" to
participation in in-patient treatment programs.' 0
A. Informal Practices
The variety of informal devices by which police, judges and prosecutors
dispose of marginally serious cases constitutes the bulk of all diversion
programs. In this informal context, diversion resembles screening; that is,
a decision by an official not to pursue charges against an alleged offender."
In 1967, a presidential commission estimated that one-third to one-half of
all criminal cases were disposed of by screening 12 and in some crime cate-
gories the screening rates may be substantially higher. 13 In many instances
the difference between informal diversion and screening amounts to little
more than meaningless, verbal conditions attached to the dismissal of
charges. 14 Although the rationale for attaching artificial conditions varies,
it often involves the belief that the imposed conditions will alter the de-
APPROACHES TO DIVERSION AND TREATMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1973). We
also do not discuss diversion of public drunkenness offenders. See R. NIMMER, Two
MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS (1971).
9 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 50 (1973); R. NIMMER, supra note 7, at
4-5; Chatfield, Pretrial Disposition in the Twin Cities, 60 A.B.A.J. 1089, 1090
(1974).
Along with the growing enthusiasm about diversion there has been a rapidly ex-
panding volume of literature on the topic. See references cited in notes 2-8 supra. See
also Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Justice Process: Informal Discretion,
Motivation and Formalization, 48 DENVER L.J. 211 (1971); Brakel & South, Diversion
from the Criminal Process in the Rural Community, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 122 (1968);
Harlow, Diversion from the Criminal Justice System, 2 CRIM. & DELINQ. LIT. 136
(1970); Newman, Corrections of the Future: Some Paradoxes in Development, in
COLLECTED PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON CORRECTIONS IN CONTEXT 3 (D. Baker ed.
1972); Robertson, Pre-trial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach, 52
B.U.L. REV. 335 (1972); Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the
Criminal Justice System, 60 GEO. L.J. 667 (1972).
10 See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT -WITH A
CRIME (1970); R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
PROSECUTION (1974); Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Justice Process: In-
formal Discretion, Motivation and Formalization, 48 DENVER L.J. 211 (1972).
11 See F. MILLER, supra note 10; Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Com-
ment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965). As to police discretionary practices amounting
to screening, see Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1969).
12See generally W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 61-153 (1965); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133
(1967); McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968); McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposi-
tion of Felony Cases, 56 A.B.A.J. 1154 (1970).
13 See, e.g., Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 WIs.
L. REV. 914; Parnas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9
CRIM. L. BULL. 733 (1973).
14 See R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at ch. 3. See also Parnas, Judicial Response to
Intrafamily Violence, 54 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1970).
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fendant's future conduct, while outright dismissal would not affect the
tendency toward deviance.
In many courts, informal diversion serves as a dispositional channel for
a significant percentage of all cases filed. For example, in Philadelphia, over
10 percent of all cases are disposed of by informal diversion, 15 while in
Chicago, 10 to 30 percent of all cases involving young adult defendants
are disposed of by informal diversion. 16 Although informal diversion in
both cities incorporates supervision and counseling, only a minority of the
defendants in fact receive such Services. For the majority, the conditions
imposed through diversion are unenforced. Such practices are generally
"lacking in formality, low in observability, and devoid of such institutional
elements as specialization of personnel and thorough data gathering and
reporting.' 1 7 They do not attempt to establish formal alternatives to prose-
cution, but rather, they merely implement personal, discretionary judgments.
B. Programmed Diversion
Contemporary interest in diversion centers on structured programs that
in fact do involve intensive counseling in a diversion format.' 8 These new
programs, as distinguished from the more prevalent informal practices,
have been defined as a "systematic diversion alternative-a program with
pre-defined eligibility, referral, service delivery and disposition procedures,
based on the voluntary participation of the accused."' 19 This definition
emphasizes formal procedures, but such distinctions are matters of degree,
rather than substance. 20 Instead, the chief distinctions lie in the funding
and the counseling emphasis in the new programs. Most new programs are
established and maintained by large grants or legislative appropriations
whereas informal diversion functions with, and often as a reaction to, ex-
cessive caseload and limited resources. 21 Further, the emphasis of the new
programs is to utilize the diversion structure to maximize counseling per-
15 See Chatfield & Spector, Pretrial Diversion: New Concept in Criminal Justice,
60 A.B.A.J. 1089, 1092-96 (1974). See also Note, Addict Diversion: All Alternative
Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEO. L.J. 667 (1972). The Philadelphia
program is something of a hybrid in that the receipt of grant funds has enabled the
provision of actual supervision and counseling to a minority of the diverted
population.
10 See Social Service Department, Cook County Municipal Court, Boys Court 5
(unpublished, 1967).
17 Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Justice Process: Informal Discretion,
Motivation and Formalization, 48 DENVER L.J. 211, 227 (1972).
18 See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, FINAL REPORT: PROJECT
CROSSROADS (1971) [hereinafter cited as CROSSROADS REPORT]; VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCEP REPORT]. See generally Vorenberg & Vorenberg, supra
note 8.
19 ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 17. See also NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVEN-
TION SERVICE CENTER, LEGAL ISSUES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A PRETRIAL INTER-
VENTION PROGRAM (1974); D. SKOLER, PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS
IN PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 1 (1974).
20 See R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 95-103.
21 See, e.g., Speech by Senator Burditt, at National Conference on Pretrial Inter-
vention, Atlanta, Georgia, Sept. 19, 1973.
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formance and not, as in informal diversion, merely to avoid inappropriate
prosecution.
22
In addition to well-funded, caseload-balanced services, the new programs
are characterized by innovative counseling approaches. For example, one
program offers intensive probationary counseling to selected defendants. 23
In other programs, vocational counseling and placement services24 de-
livered by paraprofessional counselors are employed. 25 The vocational
emphasis reflects the philosophy of these programs that, in many instances,
criminal deviance is motivated by economic deprivation. 26
Contemporary enthusiasm for diversion emphasizes that there is sub-
stantial achievement of counseling goals. This achievement, if it occurs in
fact, is partially based on the innovative counseling provided. However, the
effectiveness of innovative counseling is not necessarily an inherent benefit
of diversion, but might be duplicated in post-conviction programs.27 Any
claim that diversion provides counseling benefits must be based on three
premises which are unrelated to the type of counseling involved. The first
premise is that counseling is more effective if the client is induced to co-
operate. In diversion, cooperation is motivated by the threat of reinstated
prosecution if the client does not cooperate and the promise of dismissal
if he does. In contrast, post-conviction counseling can only offer shortened
supervision and the threat of probation revocation; a conviction has
already occurred and cannot be avoided. A second premise is that
the trauma of arrest creates a disruption that facilitates effective coun-
seling. Diversion programs are allegedly able to exploit this disruption
because counseling occurs without the delay involved in either an adjudi-
cated verdict of guilt or a negotiated guilty plea.28 A third premise involves
labeling or deviance reinforcement theory. 29 Historically, concepts of the
impact of criminal law on deviant conduct have emphasized punishment
as a deterrant.3 0 More recently, however, social scientists have emphasized
the negative effects of punishment and of the social and personal stigma
22 See S. REP. No. 93-417, 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
23 B. COHEN, PROJECT OPERATION MIDWAY (1972); Nassau County (N.Y.) Pro-
bation Department, Operation Midway (pamphlet, 1973).
24 See ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3; Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal
Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974).
25 See BOSTON COURT RESOURCES PROJECT, THE SELECTION OF ADVOCATES AND
SCREENERS FOR A PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM (1972); MCEP REPORT, supra note
18, at 43.
26 See ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 1-2. This emphasis derives from the
early, extensive involvement of the United States Labor Department in diversion
planning and implementation. Id.
27 See Petersen, Pretrial Intervention: Formalization of the Diversion Functioln
and Its Impact, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 86, 100-04 (1973).
28 But see Cunningham, Crisis Intervention in a Probation Setting, 37 FED. PROB.
16 (1973).
29 See Vorenberg & Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 177. See generally DEVIANCE:
STUDIES IN THE PROCESS OF STIGMATIZATION AND SOCIETAL REACTION (S. Dinitz ed.
1969).
30 See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973).
[VOL.9:207
Pretrial Diversion
resulting from a criminal conviction. 31 These effects may not only impede
counseling, but may also lead to further deviance a 2
These premises raise many questions. For example, to what extent does
the stigma of an additional conviction affect a defendant who has several
prior convictions? To what extent does the speed of intervention required
to exploit crisis intervention in counseling conflict with the jurisprudential
concepts of deliberate justice? Does the arrest trauma affect a defendant's
ability to exercise a voluntary choice to participate in diversion? Is not
criminal deviance produced by influences far beyond economic problems?
These and other issues have seldom been addressed and less frequently
answered. 33 Instead, the general efficacy of diversion has been hastily and
uncritically accepted. In order to examine these issues it is necessary to
briefly review the operant structure of current diversion programs.
II. PROGRAM STRUCTURE
A. Entry Process
Most current programs follow either of two formats for identifying and
selecting clients depending upon whether or not the defendant must initiate
his own participation in the program. 34 Both formats involve (1) a de-
fendant's decision to seek participation, (2) screening by program staff, and
(3) a decision by system officials, usually either a judge or a prosecutor. The
primary difference between the two formats is the manner in which the
defendant enters the screening process. Most programs employ a screening
staff to identify potentially eligible defendants from court records, to contact
them, and to encourage their participation. In other programs, however,
the initial contact occurs only after a formal motion by the defense. 35
1. Defense Decision-Regardless of the format, the entry process in-
volves a defendant's decision. While a defendant's interest in counseling
plays some role, his decision primarily involves a balancing of the probable
payoffs of the available alternatives. The alternatives consist of either
seeking out and accepting diversion or rejecting diversion in favor of tra-
ditional processing in the criminal courts. The elements balanced in this
decision include the length of supervision, the conditions of supervision,
and the perceived labeling consequences attached to each option.36
31 See, e.g., H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS (1963); E. LEMARD, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1951);
E. SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (1971).
32 See sources cited in note 31. The extent to which this premise has been docu-
mented has recently been questioned in the corrections literature. See, e.g., Mahoney,
The Effect of Labeling upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the
Evidence, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 583 (1974).
33 See R. NIMMER, supra note 10; Comment, Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of
Expanding Social Control, 10 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 180, 209-13
(1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974).
34 See Robertson, Pre-Trial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach,
52 B.U.L. REV. 335 (1972).
35 See Robertson & Teitelbaum, Optimizing Legal Impact: A Case Study in Search
of a Theory, 1973 WIs. L. REV. 665, 695-99.
36 Id. at 704-07. See also R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 99.
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Diversion will be sought out only if its probable consequences are less harsh
than those probable under traditional prosecution.
This formulation is significant because, in most current programs, many
defendants reject diversion in favor of prosecution. For example, in one
study, less than 5 percent of all potentially eligible defendants sought
diversion because the program, which applied to drug offenses, required
periods of counseling that exceeded the probable sentence upon conviction,
because the drug counseling involved undesirable conditions and resulted
in an undesirable label of "drug dependency," and because conviction could
often be avoided under normal prosecution.3
7
Similar considerations can be inferred from a study of the Manhattan
Court Employment Project (MCEP) in which only 14 percent of a sample
of potentially eligible defendants entered the program, a second 14 percent
simply rejected program participation, and an additional 15 percent entered
a plea of guilty, rather than enter the program.38 The rate of guilty pleas in
lieu of diversion underscores a final point. To many defendants, the poten-
tial of avoiding a conviction is not determinative. Instead, primary
emphasis is placed on the length and conditions of supervision. MCEP
requires a counseling interval of three to four months of closely supervised
counseling. 39 These data suggest that the negotiated guilty plea involved
lesser supervision .
4
2. Staff Screening-Defendants desiring to participate in the diversion
program are screened by program staff. Commonly, defendants with drug
or alcohol involvement or involvement in another counseling program are
excluded from participation. 4 1 In addition, most programs exclude appli-
cants on the basis of age, prior record, crime charged, and employment
status. 42 The existence of such standards is often cited as a primary differ-
ence between the new diversion programs and informal diversion. Although
37 See Robertson, supra note 34.
38 Zimring, Measuring the Impact of Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Justice
System, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 224, 230 (1974). In contrast, over 40 percent of all
potential eligibles petition for diversion in Operation Midway in Nassau County, New
York and over 50 percent of all persons applying for diversion are accepted by
the program. Unlike most other diversion programs, Midway applies only to de-
fendants who are facing prosecution on felony charges and against whom prelim-
inary screening has been completed and an indictment returned. Data obtained from
an ongoing American Bar Foundation study of Operation Midway, to be published
in 1976.
39 See generally MCEP REPORT, supra note 18.
40 Zimring, supra note 38.
41 The exclusion of defendants with a history of drug involvement is, of course,
not followed in those diversion programs structured as primarily or exclusively
applicable to defendants charged with drug offenses. In such programs, however,
the emphasis tends to be on persons involved with marijuana, rather than heroin,
and persons lacking long histories of addiction. For long-standing addicts, diversion
may occur, but generally involves an institutional treatment alternative. See gen-
erally Robertson, Pre-trial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach, 52
B.U.L. REV. 335 (1972); Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the
Criminal Justice System, 60 GEo. L.J. 667 (1972); Note, Diversion of Drug Of-
fenders in California, 26 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1974).
4 2 See, e.g., Court Employment Program, The Court Employment Project (pam-
phlet, 1973).
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these standards allegedly remove or control discretion, they in fact serve
only to exclude defendants who do not meet the criteria. Defendants who
do meet the formal criteria must conform to additional discretionary
screening standards. In most programs these discretionary decisions tend
to select young adult, first offenders charged with nonserious (often
property) offenses.43 Furthermore, a common discretionary standard is that
the defendant be motivated for counseling. This motivational standard may
be salient from a counseling perspective, but it injects broad, uncontrolled
personal judgment into the screening process.
Among the influences on staff discretion is the judicial and prosecutorial
overview under which the programs function. All defendants selected for
the program must be approved by either a judge or prosecutor and the pro-
gram's continued existence often depends on the continuing approval and
cooperation of these officials. In response, staff decisions reflect predictions
about whether the officials will allow diversion. 44 This prediction process
impacts on the quality of the selection enterprise from a counseling per-
spective, frequently giving predominance to prosecution policy to the
exclusion or minimization of issues related to counseling impact. The cen-
tral question often becomes whether the case is acceptable on policy bases
instead of whether the defendant is likely to benefit from counseling.
[I]n some sites [there is a movement] away from the tendency to
view the participant in terms of . . . artificial charge distinc-
tion. . . . In other sites, however, the . . . emphasis [is] on
achieving the diversion of defendants rather than [on] matching
defendant service needs to the program's service capabilities. As
a result . . . significant numbers of defendants are enrolled who
had no apparent need for the full range of services offered. 41
The resultant tendency is to select defendants defined as less serious
from a prosecution perspective. For example, many diversion programs
were initiated with a formal restriction to misdemeanor cases, but this re-
striction was later abandoned. 46 Even with the expansion into felony cases,
43 See generally ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 20-29; R. NIMMER, supra note
10, at 96-105; Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J.
827, 832-36 (1974).
44 See R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 101-03.
In short, there is clearly a delicate balance to be achieved between the
court's view of a particular defendant as a diversion possibility and
a project's interest in the same defendant as a recipient of intensive
counseling and manpower services.
ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 29. The prediction process is not immutable,
however, and defendants beyond current parameters of the judge or prosecutor are
occasionally selected. In such instances, debate between staff and officials determines
whether the defendant is diverted but the frequency and adversary nature of the
debates is muffled by the need to retain cooperative relations with the prosecutor.
R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 102.
45 ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 28-29.
4 6 See generally MCEP REPORT, supra note 18. See R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at
53-58. The seriousness of the crime charged may not be a relevant criterion for pre-
dicting counseling impact. See generally Statements of Ennis Olgiati and William
Henschel in Hearings on S. 3309 Before the Subcomm. on Penitentiaries of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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however, the emphasis is on nonviolent crimes involving defendants with a
minimal or no prior record. 47 Selections also emphasize low or moderate
risks from a counseling perspective. In part, this derives from a need to
establish credibility in the program by producing low recidivism rates.
3. Official's Decisions-As the above implies, discretionary decisions by
judges and prosecutors are often framed in terms of prosecution policy. Is
the alleged crime serious? Is a conviction likely? Is the defendant an indi-
vidual against whom a criminal conviction is desirable or necessary? 48
Some judgments are exercised at the outset of the program as officials and
program personnel establish mutually acceptable eligibility criteria, while
other judgments are made on a case-by-case basis.
B. Program Participation
There are four general counseling approaches. The first emphasizes job
counseling and placement and was used in the two initial diversion pro-
grams in Washington and New York and was subsequently adopted in a
nine-program series funded by the Department of Labor. 49 In most pro-
grams, no psychological testing or counseling is conducted and the
vocational counseling, in light of the low achievement level of most clients,
relates primarily to basic job retention skills.50 The counseling interval
involves repeated referrals to potential employers until the client obtains
and holds a job. 5' Such counseling terms usually range between three and
six months. 52
The second approach utilizes a professional staff and extensive, wide-
ranging counseling. The most notable illustration is Operation Midway in
Nassau County, New York, which focuses on indicted, young adult
defendants. 53 Operation Midway counseling is delivered by trained case-
workers with caseloads of twenty-five clients. 54 Both individual and group
therapy are used as are referrals to job training and other programs. 55 The
47 A reverse pattern, involving later limitations on crime seriousness may occur.
For example, in Operation Midway, the initial focus was young adult felony de-
fendants and exclusion was not mandated even if a prior felony record existed.
See generally B. COHEN, PROJECT OPERATION MIDWAY (1972). Recent revisions in
the New York Penal Code, requiring incarceration for second felony offenses in
specified instances, have led to increased sensitivity to a prior record exclusion.
48 See R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 96-98.
49 See generally ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3; CROSSROADS REPORT, supra note
18; MCEP REPORT, supra note 18.
50 ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 63-76; R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at ch. 7.
In a study of nine diversion programs using this counseling approach, 15 percent
of all clients were never placed in a job and an overall ratio of about two referrals
per placement obtained. In two programs over 60 percent of all clients required
multiple referrals before placement was achieved. Id. at 65. See also MCEP REPORT,
supra note 18, at 7.
51 MCEP REPORT, supra note 18.
52 See NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, DESCRIPTIVE PROFILES
ON SELECTED PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS (1974).
53 See generally B. COHEN, PROJECT OPERATION MIDWAY (1972); Nassau County
(N.Y.) Probation Department, Operation Midway (pamphlet, 1973).
54 R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 69.
55 1d. at 70-72.
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counseling term ranges between twelve and eighteen months. 50
These two approaches are applied to general client populations. In
contrast, the third and fourth methods have been adapted to specialized
populations. One, in Washington, D.C., applied to defendants who had
apparent mental illness problems. 57 In that program, clients received no
counseling but were referred to a variety of community-based mental
health programs. 58 The other method applies to drug-dependent popula-
tions59 and involves admission to participating drug treatment programs
which provide services on either an in-patient or out-patient basis.60
C. Termination Practices
In most programs, supervision between program entry and termination
is almost exclusively a counseling function at the discretion of the program
staff, subject to the guidance of general policies. Following expiration of
the specified counseling interval, diversion clients are terminated as suc-
cessful if so considered by the counseling staff. The decision is discretionary
and premised on whether the staff believes that the client has adequately
cooperated with counseling and placement activities. 61 Rates of successful
completion may vary from 30 to 90 percent among current programs.6 2
The clientele terminated as unsuccessful are returned to normal prosecu-
tion channels. The decision to terminate unfavorably is also made at the
virtually uncontrolled discretion of program staff. Although a variety of
criteria, such as rearrest while in the program, may be used in the decision
process,6 3 the chief reason for unfavorable terminations is failure to
cooperate 64 and a determination that the client has not cooperated is
seldom reviewed or contested. 65 In contrast, a staff decision that the client
561d.
57 See E. DeGrazia, Report on Pretrial Diversion of Accused Offenders to Com-
munity Mental Health Treatment Programs (unpublished, 1972).
58 Id. at 1-2.
59 See, e.g., Robertson & Teitelbaum, Optimizing Legal Impact: 4 Case Study in
Search of a Theory, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 665; Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative
Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEO. L.J. 667 (1972). A further model
not discussed here is the police "family crisis intervention units." In this model, of-
ficers are specially trained in crisis intervention and referral processes. See BARD,
TRAINING POLICE AS SPECIALISTS IN FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION (1970).
60 R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at ch. 10.
61 ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 79.
62 See generally ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 78 (for nine programs, comple-
tion rates ranged from 89 percent to 64 percent); COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT,
QUARTERLY REPORTS (1970-74); D. Freed, E. DeGrazia & W. Loh, The New Haven
Pretrial Diversion Program: A Preliminary Evaluation 71 (unpublished, June 1973)
[hereinafter cited as D. Freed].
63 R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at ch. 7; Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal
Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 850 (1974).
64 See ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 78 (48 precent of all unfavorable termina-
tions in nine programs); D. Freed, supra note 62, at 71. The judgment about client
cooperation supersedes, in most cases, any formally announced criteria. For ex-
ample, in a nine program study, one-third of all participants rearrested during the
program participation were not terminated. Note, supra note 63, at 850.
65 But see ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 83 .
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has successfully completed counseling results in a recommendation for dis-
missal that is reviewed by the prosecutor and judge. In most programs,
dismissals are granted routinely, although the decision is a discretionary
one and involves an interaction between counseling staff and criminal
justice officials. 6 In several programs fewer than 50 percent of all successful
clients receive dismissals.67 The remainder receive minimal sentences and
charge concessions in return for a plea of guilty.68
III. EVALUATIVE COMMENTS
Contemporary support for diversion assumes that current programs serve
important criminal justice objectives. In general, contemporary assumptions
are that diversion ameliorates the harsh consequences of criminal prosecu-
tion, that it provides an effective counseling environment, and that it is a
cost beneficial mode of case processing. Each of these assumptions is,
however, of questionable validity based on data currently available and the
remainder of this paper is directed toward an articulation and examination
of these assumptions. Before proceeding, however, it is desirable to make
two preliminary points.
First, the new programs are desirable from the standpoint of metropolitan
courts and prosecutors' offices. As the existence of informal diversion and
extensive screening suggests, officials often make use of dispositions that
do not involve formal convictions. Caseload pressure creates a need to
follow priorities among cases and to achieve maximal efficiency in cases
that are not sufficiently serious to warrant extensive time and effort. The
diversion programs provide an outlet for such nonserious cases and the
outlet is highly useful. Since entry and supervisory periods are conducted
primarily by program staff, prosecutors and judges have only minimal
contact with the diverted case and are free to deal with other cases.
Second, any current assessment of diversion must account for the relative
newness of the programs. Current programs have adequate funding and
aggressive, enthusiastic staffs. Most exhibit an almost missionary zeal that
is uncharacteristic of correctional programs that have become routinized
components of the justice system. Both the funding and the enthusiasm
may be transitory.
[One of the] cardinal weaknesses in the diversion movement.
[is] the total absence of uniformity among programs and their
66 R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 60-62, 72-73.
67 The rates vary dramatically. In most programs, less than 10 percent of success-
ful clients do not receive a dismissal. However, in Operation Midway the dismissal
rate was approximately 50 percent. R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 72. In a San
Antonio program the rate was 14 percent and in three California programs, rates
of dismissal were 85 percent, 76 percent and 34 percent. ABT ASSOCIATES, supra
note 3, at 80-81. The different rates of dismissal reflect local discretionary policies
followed by criminal justice officials. In most programs, the prosecutor controls
the dismissal decision while in others, the judiciary controls. This distinction does
not, apparently, affect the dismissal rate, but rather, the principal distinction is in the
individual decision-makers.
68 R. NIMMER, supra note 10.
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failure to date to transcend dependence upon the personalities of
the principal actors, project directors and prosecutors, and the
peculiarities of the locality in which the programs exist.
69
A. Amelioration of Prosecution
A basic premise is that diversion represents a lenient disposition in con-
trast to the harsh consequences of prosecution, both in terms of stigmatizing
labels and in terms of length and type of supervision. Upon analysis, how-
ever, it appears that diversion may tend toward the opposite result for some
clients. Table 1 summarizes the potential results relevant to severity of
disposition, assuming that all successful diversion clients receive dismissal
of charges.
TABLE 1
SUPERVISION AND LABELING OUTCOMES
Diversion Prosecution
Successful Unsuccessful Convicted Not Convicted
Label Arrest Arrest and Arrest record Arrest record
Effects record results of and results
prosecution of conviction
Supervision 3-18 month Diversion Pretrial and Pretrial
Term counseling counseling, result of
pretrial and conviction
result of
prosecution
This table compares the leniency of disposition by diversion with dis-
position by prosecution. For example, diversion produces a benefit in
terms of labeling effects only for successful clients who would otherwise
have been convicted. The benefit would consist of the difference between
an arrest record and a record including both arrest and conviction. The
magnitude of the benefit would vary according to the client's social en-
vironment, the charge on which the client would otherwise have been
convicted, and whether the client had a record of prior convictions. For
unsuccessful participants and for defendants who would otherwise have
escaped conviction, no labeling benefit occurs.
One assumption of literature favorable to diversion is that all clients
entering a diversion program would otherwise have been convicted.70 In
69 Peterson, Pretrial Intervention: Formalization of the Diversion Function and Its
Impact, 28 U. MIAMi L. REv. 86, 112 (1973).
70 For example, the author of one article contends:
A ... factor which would appear to account for the inception and ac-
ceptance of the pretrial intervention strategy is its compatibility with
the realities of the criminal court system. . .. [A] substantial majority
of individuals arrested and charged with criminal offenses have, in
fact, committed the acts alleged. . .. [Tlhe presumption of innocence
WINTER 1976] 219
Journal of Law Reform
fact, however, 40 to 50 percent of all arrests do not result in conviction.
More on point, in several studies of defendant populations comparable to
diversion clients, between 20 to 50 percent received dismissals without
diversion. 71 It might be argued that the defendant's voluntary choice to
enter the program will exclude from the results all individuals who other-
wise would be able to avoid conviction. The argument, however, assumes
that defendants will make accurate evaluations of evidence even though
such evaluations may not be feasible at the point that a decision must be
made. Further, since many dismissals are based on policy decisions, the
argument assumes that the defense can predict the exercise of prosecutor
discretion. Empirically, the argument is rebutted by the frequent dismissals
from prosecution received by unfavorably terminated diversion clients.7 2
In fact, diversion may be used to increase the range of cases in which state
control is exercised within the criminal justice system. 73 Since the prose-
cutor controls the potential outcomes that affect the defendant's choice, by
increasing the length of the potential sentence, the prosecutor can make
contesting charges less attractive to the defendant. Thus, even if there is a
perceived probability of avoiding conviction, any tendency to submit to
prosecution might be overridden by the comparative risks involved. If, for
example, the probability of avoiding conviction is 50 percent but the
likely sentence on conviction is three years incarceration, a defendant
could rationally opt for a three month diversion program. As a result,
diversion could become a dumping ground for cases in which evidence
of guilt is uncertain.74 Ultimately, diversion would become a more potent
form of plea bargaining in which the prosecutor would be able to use the
possibility of obtaining a dismissal to further induce the defendant to
forego challenging the charges filed. 75
The potential for abuse and the fact that current diversion programs
may extend state control to defendants who otherwise would not have been
convicted suggest the necessity of safeguards to ensure that diversion is
limited to defendants who are probably guilty and who, in fact, would
is based on considerations, albeit extremely important ones, which do
not include statistical probability. . . . On the contrary, the system
functions upon the assumption that the great majority of cases will be
disposed of by guilty plea ...
Id. at 90.
71 D. Freed, supra note 62, at 76 (29 percent of a comparison group were ul-
timately dismissed); Statement by J. Trotter in Hearings on S. 3309 Before the
Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1972) (over 50 percent of unfavorable terminations in Project
Crossroads); Zimring, Measuring the Impact of Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal
Justice System, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 237 (1974) (51 percent of a comparison
group of potential eligibles).
72 See Statement by J. Trotter, supra note 71.
73 Comment, Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control, 10
HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 180 (1975).
74 F. Miller, Evaluation of Research on Pretrial Diversion 88 (unpublished manu-
script, 1974).
75 Goldberg, Pretrial Diversion: Bilk or Bargain, 31 NLADA BRIEFCASE 490, 491
(1973).
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likely have been convicted. In this respect, the necessary safeguards will
not be met by merely requiring that the defendant plead guilty before
entering the program. Plea negotiation could readily be structured to obtain
this result without actually testing whether conviction would have occurred
in the absence of a diversion program.
Returning to Table 1, we can now compare the severity of the super-
vision under diversion programs with traditional prosecution. Diversion
increases the supervision of defendants who would not have been convicted.
It also increases supervision for unfavorably terminated defendants, unless
the term served in the diversion program is subtracted from the eventual
sentence.7 6 Diversion counseling is a less severe form of supervision only
for favorably terminated clients who would have been convicted as a result
of prosecution. In order to argue for diversion, advocates often assume that
many diversion clients would otherwise receive incarceration. 77 To assume
incarceration, however, is even less tenable than to assume a conviction.
The prosecutorial, judicial, and program policies which focus diversion on
less serious cases produce client populations which are less likely to receive
incarceration than would a random sample of cases. Since, in most courts,
incarceration occurs in much less than one-third of all cases a reasonable
assumption is that few, if any, diversion clients would have received incar-
ceration. 78
A plausible comparison can be made between diversion counseling and
anticipated terms of probation. In this comparison, two suggestive observa-
tions are relevant. First, since diversion clientele are selected from among
the less serious cases, the expected term of probation would be brief.
Second, diversion counseling is more intensive with more frequent contact
between counselor and client than in traditional probation. As a result,
judgments on the relative severity of the supervision imposed might involve
a trade-off between lengthier terms of less supervised conduct (probation)
and briefer terms of intensely supervised behavior (diversion). For exam-
76 There is, in fact, some indication that unfavorably terminated clients receive
less favorable handling in subsequent prosecution. See Note, Pretrial Diversion from
the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 851 (1974).
77 See J. HOLOHON, REPORT ON A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PROJECT CROSS-
ROADS 10 (1970); MCEP REPORT, supra note 18, at 50.
78 Freed reports the following dispositions for a comparison group of defendants in
New Haven:
dismissal - 22%
fine - 37%
suspended sentence - 18%
unknown - 23%
No incarceration sentences were found. D. Freed, supra note 62, at 79.
Zimring reports the following for a comparison group in New York:
not convicted - 51%
fine - 11%
probation - 6%
unconditional discharge - 3%
conditional discharge - 15%
jail - 7%
unknown - 7%
Zimring. supra note 71. at 237.
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ple, in Operation Midway in Nassau County, New York, clients received
intense supervision and counseling for an average of fifteen months, while
a group of potentially eligible nonparticipants received an average term of
4.5 years probation with less intense supervision. 79 Which set of disposi-
tions is more severe?
It is occasionally argued that diversion, while involving more intense
supervision, includes effective, qualified counseling, while probation
involves simply supervision. Although the effectiveness of diversion coun-
seling is discussed in part III B infra, it is relevant here to note that an
emphasis has developed on good counselor intentions which parallels
arguments in support of juvenile court informality that state control is
justified as in the client's best interest. The argument has been questioned
in the juvenile court system and should be questioned here. 80 Labeling
control as being in the client's best interest does not ensure that it is.
The similarity between the contemporary diversion movement and the
prior movement to establish a juvenile court system s ' arises in both the
characterization of the counseling and in terms of the degree of discretion.
Diversion counseling is wholly at the discretion of the counselor and
involves little or no judicial review. The decision to terminate a client as
unfavorable is discretionary and not generally reviewed. In this respect,
recent Supreme Court decisions concerning due process in the juvenile
court and decisions establishing that revocation of parole or probation
requires a judicial hearing are relevant. 82
B. Counseling Benefits
Central to contemporary enthusiasm for diversion is the belief that it
reduces recidivism. Although this belief is widely held, empirical data offer
little or no support.
Prior to discussing several evaluative studies, it is necessary to mention
a difficulty relating to current research on diversion counseling. Even if
diversion clients demonstrate different post-program recidivism than do a
control group of nonparticipating defendants, it is not clear what char-
acteristic of the diversion program produces the difference. The argument
79 Data from an ongoing American Bar Foundation Study of Operation Midway
to be published in 1976.
80 See H. PERLMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN ADDICT DIVERSION (1974); Balch, Deferred
Prosecution: The Juvenilization of the Criminal Justice System, 38 FED. PROB. 46
(1974); Peterson, supra note 69, at 105-14; Comment, Pretrial Diversion: The Threat
of Expanding Social Control, 10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 180 (1975);
Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 807 (1974). See
generally NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION CENTER, LEGAL ISSUES AND CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS (1974).
81 Occasionally, the similarity of the descriptive language is striking. Note, for ex-
ample, the following description of a Philadelphia diversion court. "The approach
is unique. The court has no interest in punishment or even in determining guilt.
Rather, the concern is to save the defendant .. " Specter, Philadelphia's Accel-
erated Rehabilitative Disposition Program, 60 A.B.A.J., 1092, 1092-93 (1974).
82 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). In fact, at least one diversion program has recently instituted a hearing pro-
cedure to review unfavorable terminations. See ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 83;
H. PERLMAN, supra note 80, at 46-54.
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has been that counseling in lieu of prosecution facilitates effective counsel-
ing. Evaluation studies have compared program clients to allegedly similar
defendants submitted to traditional prosecution. Differential recidivism has
led to the conclusion that the program is effective and, ultimately, to the
generalization that the diversion concept is valid. However, there are
numerous characteristics. of a diversion program relevant to counseling
impact that are sharply divergent from traditional correctional services. Sa
The correct test is whether the differential results can be obtained for simi-
lar clients in similar counseling formats that are located, respectively, in a
preconviction and a postconviction setting. The effectiveness of diversion
counseling is established only if differential recidivism relates directly to
the timing of the counseling. If such a relationship is not established, coun-
seling impact might be replicated by a similar, well-funded counseling
program in a correctional, postconviction setting. The issue is important
because, as was argued in part III A supra, the timing of diversion inter-
vention produces undesired effects not present in a postconviction setting.
Current research has adopted a more blunt-edged approach. It compares
the diversion program, including all of its innovative characteristics, to the
conglomerate of dismissals, probation, and incarceration meted out by the
traditional prosecution system. Even at this undifferentiated level, however,
the research has failed to demonstrate that the diversion program is more
effective.
The basic materials around which success claims have been built are
found in the final reports of the Manhattan Court Employment Program
(MCEP) 8 4 and Operation Crossroads 5 in Washington, D.C. Based in
large part on the lower recidivism rates for participants reported in these
studies, a Senate committee remarked:
[T]he real benefit of pretrial diversion is the final result: the indi-
vidual who has completed a program of pretrial diversion is much
less likely to commit another crime than the individual who goes
through the criminal justice system in the normal way. . . . The
likelihood of future recidivism was substantially reduced. .... 86
83 For example, some characteristics of a diversion program which are unique in
comparison to traditional correctional services are: low counseling caseloads, abun-
dant supportive services, innovative counseling techniques, specially selected coun-
seling staffs, and voluntary client entry. Furthermore, the initial point of counseling
contact may also affect variables related to labeling effects, crisis intervention effects,
and the threat of prosecution as an incentive.
84 MCEP REPORT, supra note 18, at 47.
85 CROSSROADS REPORT, supra note 18, at 35.
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS REARRESTED AFTER CONTACT
WITH MCEP AND OPERATION CROSSROADS a
All Control Group of
Participants Nonparticipants
MCEP 20% (214)b 32% (91)
Crossroads 30% (200) 43% (107)
a MCEP involved a twelve-month follow-up on recidivism while
Crossroads reported a fifteen-month follow-up.
b Number of defendants in parentheses.
86S. REP. No. 417, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
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The conclusion that recidivism was reduced is unwarranted. For exam-
ple, a recent review of diversion research presents a reanalysis of the
Crossroads data that questions whether any general reduction of recidivism
occurred, even assuming that the study design was valid."' This analysis
distinguished between rearrests occurring while the defendant was in the
program and arrests occurring after the program. Based on this distinction,
it appears that the differential during the post-program interval was not
statistically significant, even though the in-program differential was sig-
nificant. Thus, at best, the Crossroads data suggests a lower recidivism
rate only during the period that participants are in close contact with the
program. However, methodological deficiencies in both the Crossroads and
the MCEP study render even this apparent result meaningless.
Both the Crossroads and the MCEP evaluations adopt a comparison
group methodology. The basic rationale for contrasting the recidivism of
participants to the recidivism of selected nonparticipants was to estimate
what participant performance would have obtained had not the program
intervened. It was, of course, essential that the nonparticipant group be
similar to the participant group in all relevant respects. In both MCEP and
Crossroads, the comparison group was selected from among defendants who
would have been eligible for the program on the basis of court records
concerning charge, age, and prior record but whose cases were filed prior
to the implementation of the program.8 8
Available evidence suggests that the comparison and participant groups
did not represent similar populations. In practice, the court records
served only for the initial screening stage in both programs. 89 Before
program entry, defendants were further screened by program staff
in personal interviews and by the prosecutor.9 0 Furthermore, in the actual
program the defendant had to elect to seek admission.91 In MCEP, 86
percent of all persons eligible on the basis of court records did not enter
the program.9 2 In Crossroads, this later screening was allegedly less intense,
but still occurred. 93 Furthermore, the participants were more motivated for
counseling while comparison group members had unknown motivation.
87 R. ROVNER-PRECZNEK, PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: AN EVALUATION OF
POLICY-RELATED RESEARCH AND POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS 76, 82 (1974).
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS REARRESTED IN OPERATION CROSS-
ROADS BY TIMING OF REARREST
During One Year
In-Programa Post Program
Participants 9% (200)b 21% (200)
Comparison 22% (107) 22% (107)
a The in-program period is the first three months for all participants.
b Number of individuals studied.
88 MCEP REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-60.
89 R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 64-65. See also Zimring, supra note 71.
90 R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at 64-65.
91 id.
92 Zimring, supra note 71, at 230.
93 F. Miller, supra note 74, at 45.
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The participant group was closely screened to exclude individuals with drug
addiction and other problems while the comparison group was not so
screened. The overall result is a comparison of dissimilar groups. 9 4
Despite these deficiencies, the two original studies serve as primary bases
of support for diversion counseling. Their implications are seemingly
buttressed by data compiled by most other diversion programs which also
claim low rates of rearrest for successful participants." While used as
support for a conclusion about diversion counseling, these data in fact
show only that carefully selected, motivated defendants exhibit low rates
of recidivism-a conclusion that is potentially independent of the treatment
that they are subjected to.
Three additional studies of recidivism should be noted. Each began with
the intention of utilizing a randomly assigned control group. The first study
involves Project De Novo in Minneapolis. 6 Project De Novo follows the
job counseling format, but its counseling may extend for twelve months
rather than the three months in most such programs.97 The evaluation was
conducted by ABT Associates as one segment of a study monitoring nine
programs.98 The De Novo study began with a random assignment
model,99 but this approach was abandoned midway through the study. 100
94 After making these same points, Zimring presents new data on MCEP's impact.
Zimring, supra note 71, at 232-34. In his data, a comparison is drawn between
persons eligible on the basis of court records but who appeared on weekends when
diversion screening was not conducted, with persons eligible on the basis of court
data who were later exposed to MCEP screening. These data failed to indicate that
the group in which some members underwent diversion counseling produced an
improved recidivism rate.
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MCEP WHO WERE
REARRESTED WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER NORMAL
COUNSELING PERIOD
Potential
Age Eligiblea Weekend Difference
16-17 47 (71)b 38 (61) -9
18-20 41 (81) 40 (105) -1
21-29 31 (141) 25 (171) -6
30+ 15 (60) 17 (102) +2
All ages 34 (353) 29 (439) -5
a Includes those selected for diversion treatment.
b Number of persons studied.
Although only 14 percent of the potential eligibles entered the diversion program,
Zimring found no improved performance in groups having higher percentage con-
centrations of participants. Id. at 233-34.
95 MCEP and Crossroads data are for initial years of operation only. More recent
rearrest information include: Operation Midway reporting 10 percent rearrest of all
favorable terminations (B. COHEN, supra note 47); Dade County, 1.6 percent
(Petersen, supra note 69, at 98); and Philadelphia, 16.8 percent in 1971 and 7.7 per-
cent in 1972 (Specter, supra note 81, at 1094). See also ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note
3, at 100-02.
96 ASSOCIATES, supra note 3.
97 See R. NIMMER, supra note 10, at ch. 7; Henschel & Skrien, Operation De Novo,
1972 HENNEPIN LAWYER 26 (May/June).
98 ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 91-115.
99 ld. at 107-10.
100 Id.
WINTER 1976]
Journal of Law Reform
As a result, only a portion of the comparison group was obtained by ran-
dom assignment, and over one-half were obtained by a search of court
records.10 1 The overall group is thus subject to the same deficiencies noted
for MCEP and for Crossroads. Although ABT found that control and
participant groups were demographically similar,10 2 they could not control
for similarity of motivation or underlying addiction problems.
Even with this limitation, the conclusions suggested in the ABT report
are questionable. In an initial comparison, the study manually searched
criminal records to derive recidivism data, but no significant differences in
recidivism were found.'0 3 In a second effort, the study drew random sam-
ples of fifty successful participants, fifty failures, and fifty of the original
sixty-seven person control group. 10 4 For an initial three month interval,
recidivism data was obtained from three sources: manual search of local
records, local computerized court records search, and statewide com-
puterized criminal records search.'0 5 A comparison using all three sources
found no significant difference between the comparison group and
participants. 10 6 A comparison that utilized the two computerized sources
did, however, show a sharp differential. 10 7 For the fifteen month interval
following this initial three months, only the computerized records were
used. 08 The ABT report presents tests of statistical significance for each
comparison and notes that all are "significant," except the "all source"
comparison (the most complete) and the ten to fifteen month interval.
The two other studies are more plausible, but provide only limited sup-
port for a conclusion about counseling impact. The first was conducted in
Des Moines, Iowa, and it encompasses not only diversion counseling but
also a bail review program designed to reduce pretrial confinement. 10 9 The
study design was initiated under a random assignment model. 110 Applicants
were fully screened, and eligible defendants were then randomly assigned
101 Id.
102 Id. at 107-08, 239A.
l,3 Id. at 108.
104 Id. at 109.
105 Id.
106Id. at 111.
107 Id.
108 PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS REARRESTED IN PROJECT
DE Novo
All Sources Computer Data Only
1-3a 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16-21
Participants .21 .08 .05 .07 .10 .08
Controls .30 .28 .28 .24 .20 .19
a Number of months after beginning of study.
Id. at 111. Interestingly, the report also indicates that, as between favorable and un-
favorable terminations "there is clearly a strong argument ... that over the long-
term, unfavorables are rearrested no more often than favorables." Id. at 182.
109 See F. Miller, supra note 74, at 50.
110 Id.
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to the counseling program and normal prosecution."'
Although the differential was reported as statistically significant under
a Fischer test,112 the results may be questioned. The random procedure
was not routinely followed 13 and a test of demographic data indicated that
the two groups were dissimilar on variables potentially relevant to recidi-
vism.1 14 The differential may have resulted from deviations from the
random procedure. More likely, it is a result of the small size of the control
group. Random assignment does not imply that similarity of composition
will invariably occur, but only that systematic bias is not introduced. The
probability of similar groups increases as their numerical size increases.
The final study" 5 was conducted in Dade County, Florida. The Dade
County program was similar to the other job placement programs. The
study followed a random assignment procedure, placing 20 percent of all
eligible applicants into a control group." 6 Based on demographic data, the
control group was similar to the participant group. 117 Although the study
represents some proof of counseling impact, at least two problems are
present. First, one year after the program began rearrests were examined
and reported for all control group members, but only for participants in
the diversion program who had completed the program. As a result, the
different periods of time and exposure to rearrest may explain the difference
in rearrest rates. Second, the differential might be partly explained by
control group reaction to being informed that, although eligible, they would
not be diverted." 8
Beyond this limited and misleading data on recidivism, diversion
programs also cite data on employment of participants to document their
counseling impact.119 At best, the data document improvement during the
111The following rearrest data was obtained by following the performance of
controls and participants for a minimum of six months.
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS REARRESTED IN DES MOINES
Participants 20 (157)a
Controls 31 (35)
a Number of persons studied.
F. Miller, supra note 74, at 50.
1121d.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS REARRESTED IN
DADE COUNTY
Participants 8.8 (161)a
Controls 20.6 (34)
Number of Persons Studied.
The differential is significant in a test of chi square. Petersen, supra note 69, at 97-99.
11 Id. at 95.
117 Id. at 98.
118 See generally D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUAsI-ExPERI-
MENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963). The Dade County study also suffers from
problems inherent in the small size of the control group. R. ROVNER-PRECZNEK,
supra note 87, at 36.
119 See R. ROVNER-PRECZNEK, supra note 87, at 55-73.
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intensive placement activities while a client is in the program, with marked
decay in subsequent months. 2 0 No comparisons are made between partici-
pants and nonparticipants. 12 1
C. Costs and Benefits
In an effort to establish diversion as a useful and effective reform, sup-
porters of several diversion programs have presented analyses described as
cost-benefit assessments. 1 22 Cost-benefit analysis attaches estimated dollar
values to the projected impacts of a policy change and compares positively
and negatively assessed changes. The analytical procedure requires a
plausible basis for projection and an estimation procedure that approxi-
mates reality. In the diversion context, sufficient reliable data are not now
available. For example, costs associated with recidivism rates and employ-
ment patterns would be highly relevant, but no basis exists on which to
estimate them reliably.
In the absence of the necessary information, the only question that can
reasonably be asked is whether the presence of a diversion program repre-
sents a net increase or decrease in the total dollars expended on case
processing in the criminal justice system. Most cost-benefit analysis con-
trasts the per client expense of diversion counseling with the per defendant
cost of court processing and the per client cost of either probation or
incarceration. 1 23 The comparison yields the conclusion that traditional
processing is more expensive. However, the relevant issue should be
whether it is cost-beneficial to maintain a criminal justice system including
a diversion program. Since, absent marginal dollar savings, most diversion
programs add an annual cost of over $200,000 to system expenditures,
clearly documented benefits in recidivism, employment, or other client
performance measures would be necessary for an affirmative answer.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cloaked in substantially more enthusiasm than the data warrant, pretrial
diversion in the criminal justice system must be critically reassessed and
reevaluated. The research and analysis to date are greatly deficient and do
not answer the question whether diversion is desirable.
The dominant opinion that diversion is successful can be dissected into
a number of subpremises. A brief review suggests that none of these sub-
premises are supported by currently available data.
Diversion counseling more effectively reduces recidivism than would a
similar counseling format in a different context. Since evaluation studies
120 ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, at 118.
121 Only the ABT study of Project De Novo presents comparative data, and the
data is subject to the same criticisms about comparability of groups noted earlier.
See text accompanying notes 96-102 supra.
122See, e.g., J. HOLOHON, supra note 77; MCEP REPORT, supra note 18, at 50;
Peterson, supra note 69, at 99-104.
128 But see Note, supra note 80, at 849-50. See generally R. ROVNER-PRECZNEK,
supra note 87, at 92-102.
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have not compared diversion counseling with similar counseling techniques
in other settings, current research offers no support for this.
Diversion counseling more effectively reduces recidivism than do normal
modes of case processing and correctional services. This issue has been
addressed, but not answered. With one exception, current program evalua-
tions contain irreversible errors. Only the Dade County data may offer
some limited support if analyzed to account for differential exposure to
potential rearrest and the small size of the control group.
Diversion produces employment gains in comparison to similar correc-
tional programs or in comparison to traditional case processing modes.
Again, there are no data on the first comparison and unreliable data on the
second. The effect is unknown.
Diversion reduces court congestion. This statement may be accurate for
informal diversion programs that handle sizeable proportions of a court's
caseload. For the new programs, the effect is most often limited to the less
than 4 percent of the cases reached.' 24
Diversion is acceptable to the traditional legal system participants. This
statement could have been documented prior to the new diversion move-
ment since informal diversion was an auxiliary from the perspective of
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and defendants. For most new pro-
grams, experience documents that the concept is functional and utilized in 1
to 4 percent of a court's caseload.
Diversion produces no harmful effects on clients. Although a firm answer
is not available, diversion may result in control of some defendants who
would otherwise not have been convicted. Further, current modes of ac-
ceptance and termination create a potential of abuse.
Diversion ameliorates the severity of treatment imposed on defendants
charged with crime. This statement is accurate from the standpoint of
formal labels only as applied to successful clients who receive dismissals
and would otherwise have been convicted. Its accuracy in terms of the
severity of supervision imposed is unknown.
Diversion is a cost-beneficial reform. No reliable data exists.
Diversion reduces current system expenditures. This conclusion is not
supported as no documented cost savings have been identified. Arguably,
the impact is the reverse.
As the summary reveals, empirical support for diversion is unimpressive.
Most premises have not been reliably confirmed and several are even ques-
tioned. Nevertheless, contemporary enthusiasm remains high.
At the core of the diversion movement is a basic perceptual bias of im-
mense importance to understanding current interest in criminal justice
reform. The perception is that the current criminal justice system is an
abject failure from virtually any major policy perspective that might be
applied to its evaluation. Whether one emphasizes crime control, rehabili-
124 Some programs do, of course, exceed this limited percentage. For example,
Operation Midway and a diversion program in Philadelphia currently divert over
10 percent.
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tation, civil liberties, or other themes, the practice of criminal justice ap-
pears almost totally ineffective or even counterproductive. This perception
has represented contemporary wisdom for many years. It has created an
intense drive for change which, in turn, has been fueled by the availability
of federal and other funds to effectuate reforms. Yet the direction that such
change should take is a subject of political and philosophical debate. Ad-
vocates of rehabilitative perspectives press for changes opposed to those
that adherents to a punishment perspective advocate. Crime control view-
points collide with civil libertarian ideals. These debates frequently prevent
a policy consensus and, hence, a full commitment to any single course of
reform activity. Occasionally, however, as with respect to diversion, a rela-
tive consensus is reached. When this occurs, there is a rush to actualize
the reform design and to achieve change. There is little time taken for
circumspection or reflection. Critical review, if it comes, typically begins
too late to rationally inform and shape the reform enterprise. When con-
trasted to the political impetus that characterizes a consensus reform
movement, the processes of research, evaluation, and critique which
question underlying premises and emphasize data are predictably ineffec-
tual. The point is not only that hasty reform movements may cause harm
but that the failure to collect, examine, and integrate the lessons of critical
or objective data reduces the probability that the reform movement will
successfully achieve its own purposes or that the resulting change will in
fact represent improvement. A call for further research is not only
inevitable, evaluation in the context of pretrial diversion is urgently needed.
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